Despite the transparency and independent operations of the central bank, the costly disin ‡ation in the early nineties and the apparent lack of contemporaneous correlation between in ‡ation and unemployment in the subsequent periods brings into question the validity of the Phillips curve hypothesis for the New Zealand economy. Nevertheless, drawing on an empirical exercise built on a narrative history, I argue that the hypothesis remains a valid view of the interaction between the real and nominal sides of the economy if we interpret that history with theories of credibility to account for the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations. Between 1987 and 2015, the survey data of in ‡ation expectations identi…es, through either a new classical or a new Keynesian representation, the changing location of the Phillips curve, illustrating how in ‡ation expectations directly a¤ect both in ‡ation and unemployment, without undermining their theoretical relationship. Findings suggest that a credible regime between 1993 and 1999 precipitated a stable manifold of relatively ‡at Phillips curves. However, probably the loss of credibility in the post-1999 era left the policymakers with a steeper Phillips curve with unstable locations. Use of the nontradable component of the consumer price index (CPI) rather than the CPI as a whole strengthens the policy conclusions based on the Phillips curve hypothesis.
Introduction
In ‡ation and unemployment no longer seem to correspond to each other. This message comes from a casual reading of New Zealand's history of disin ‡ation, especially for the last twenty-…ve years. According to a growing body of literature (see, for example, Ball and Mazumder, 2011) such lack of contemporaneous correlation between the two variables constitutes a puzzle for the conventional Phillips curve paradigm. A question arises naturally: is the Phillips curve hypothesis no longer relevant for understanding the dynamics of in ‡ation and unemployment as a part of conducting a monetary policy analysis?
Surprisingly, a careful reading of the history of disin ‡ation in New Zealand uncovers a unique lesson: once we account for how the rational expectations of in ‡ation shift in the economy, the Phillips curve hypothesis remains valid. This validation comes in a uni…ed theoretical framework that assigns a critical role for time consistency of the monetary policy objective in building credibility which anchors the rational expectations of in ‡ation. A narrative history of the economic environment in New Zealand and its interpretation within the above theoretical framework helps us identify the relevant model of the Phillips curve, its location and its slope as well as provide a clear answer to the key policy question stated above. The narrative approach focusses, in particular, on the credibility of the monetary policy objective in the overall politicio-economic environment to divide New Zealand's history of disin ‡ation into three distinct eras.
The …rst is the era of low credibility (1987 -1992) , during which the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) began its journey toward the conquest of in ‡ation and confronted friction in lowering the in ‡ation expectations. In this period, a sharp decline in the in ‡ation rate was accompanied by a sharp increase in the unemployment rate. I consider this period an era of low credibility in the RBNZ's ability to decrease in ‡ation to its targeted level. In the absence of supportive labour market and …scal reforms ahead of the monetary reforms, I argue, the RBNZ lacked the credibility in its ability to sustain its low in ‡ation target in the long run. Consequently, the rational mind resisted in lowering their in ‡ation expectation at the same pace as disin ‡ation. Yet, the disin ‡ation came swiftly and decisively as a surprise to most people. From that disin ‡ation surprise came a large increase in unemployment and that induced a substantial cost to the economy as a whole in terms of lost income and lost tax revenue. Was that cost an inevitable dictum of the Phillips curve paradigm? Could the policymakers reduce the human and output cost signi…cantly, by correctly identifying the shifting locations of the Phillips curves, with relevant theories that help trace the dynamics of the rational expectations of in ‡ation? I also explore these questions as I investigate the validity of the Phillips curve hypothesis.
The second is the era of increased credibility (1993 -1999) in the RBNZ's ability to succeed in its low in ‡ation targeting objective. This increased credibility accompanied by a steady decline of in ‡ation expectations. During this period an outcome of low in ‡ation as well as low unemployment seemed achievable. The completion of all reforms provided the critical support to complement the low in ‡ation targeting objective of the RBNZ. Consequently, I consider this era to be one of increased credibility that brought in ‡ation expectations down. Also, contrary to the sceptics who …nd this period to be inconsistent with the Phillips curve hypothesis, I argue that the lack of contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and in ‡ation in this period can be explained by a gradual decrease of expected in ‡ations over time. Thus, it allowed the New Zealand economy to enjoy low in ‡ation and low unemployment simultaneously, without a rejection of the Phillips curve hypothesis.
Third and …nally is the era of an apparent loss of credibility (2000 -2015) . The era began with the political defeat of the Shipley National government in 1999. According to Quiggin (1999) , the election result "marked the end of a …fteen-year experiment" with "radical free market reforms". He also noted that the newly elected Labour government represented a signi…cantly di¤erent political perspective on the economy and that led to the undoing of economic reforms for the …rst time since the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989 (RBNZ ACT 1989 . Those reforms upheld the low in ‡a-tion target as a sustainable outcome. Therefore, when the newly elected government revised them, arguably with di¤erent political objectives, the credibility of the in ‡a-tion targeting was also arguably compromised. Soon afterwards, the economy plunged into a period of uncertainty and confusion generating heated debates in the Parliament and controversial news headlines regarding the very objective of the monetary policy. Those confusions conceivably undermined the credibility of a sustainably low in ‡ation target and coincided with an increased volatility of in ‡ation expectations.
Also, in the post-1999 era, a seemingly vertical relationship between contemporaneous in ‡ation and unemployment raised the question of whether or not the Phillips curve hypothesis holds any longer. In particular, following the global …nancial crisis (GFC), which began in 2007, this era o¤ered a puzzle of "missing disin ‡ation" amidst persistently high unemployment in New Zealand. Perhaps this phenomenon too can have a plausible explanation within the Phillips curve paradigm. In particular, I propose that the decreased credibility in the RBNZ's strict commitment and ability to ensure a low in ‡ation rate in the long run could be attributed to the increased volatility of in ‡ation expectations and that, in turn, could provide an empirically plausible explanation for the above phenomenon.
Guided by theory and a narrative history of the three distinct eras, I formulate hypotheses regarding various speci…cations of the Phillips curve, conduct empirical tests of those hypotheses, and report my …ndings. From these tests, I conclude that the expectation-augmented Phillips curve hypothesis, irrespective of its new Keynesian and new classical origin, cannot be rejected. Theories of rational expectations, time consistency, credibility governing the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations and theoretical explanations of the slope of the Phillips curve turn out to be critical for discovering clear results, despite the apparent confusion due to the absence of a contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and in ‡ation.
Also, empirical tests seem to suggest that, following the increased activism of the Labour government since 1999, consistent with the observations made in Lucas (1973) , the Phillips curve might have become steeper. At the same time, reduced credibility coincided with an increased average level of in ‡ation expectations, even during the …rst few years of the GFC. Consequently, the low in ‡ation targeting policy, prior to bringing the in ‡ation expectations down, would ironically prolong the persistence of high unemployment, according to the expectation-augmented Phiilips curve paradigm. Thus, a careful analysis of New Zealand's disin ‡ation experience validates the Phillips curve paradigm rather than writing its obituary. Section 2 discusses literature on relevant ideas that can help explain the New Zealand experience. Section 3 provides an account of what happened in New Zealand's history of disin ‡ation and identi…es three distinct periods of in ‡ation expectations. Section 4 describes the data and empirical methodology by relating them to earlier work, prior to presenting the key empirical …ndings of the paper. Section 5 includes a few concluding remarks.
Brief Literature Survey
The original Phillips (1958) hypothesis as well as subsequent modi…cation by Samuelson and Solow (1960) missed the critical role of "in ‡ation expectations". Friedman (1968) augmented the hypothesis by incorporating the in ‡ation expectation as a shift parameter. In his model, it identi…es the location of the Phillips curve along which a tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment exists. A change in the in ‡ation expectation causes a parallel shift of the Phillips curve to a di¤erent location. Consequently, understanding the theory behind the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations holds the key to locating the Phillips curves in the data. That is the essence of the expectation augmented Phillips curve hypothesis.
Subsequently a new classical reformulation in Lucas (1972) and a new Keynesian renovation in Clarida, Gertler, and Gali (1999) and Woodford (2003) embraced Friedman's key insight behind the expectation augmented Phillips curve hypothesis. Irrespective of the di¤erences in their underlying microfoundations, theoretically in both models, the following three general results hold:
(1) An unmet or an unful…lled in ‡ation expectations, where in ‡ation or de ‡ation comes as a surprise, generates a negative tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment.
(2) A decreased expectation implies a downward shift of the Phillips curve, which reduces the cost of disin ‡ation.
(3) If the in ‡ation expectation is anchored at any level then the demand shocks generate a negative correlation and the supply shocks generate a positive correlation, between the in ‡ation rate and the unemployment rate.
However, a discrepancy in the pace of change between in ‡ation and its expectation could potentially generate an apparently puzzling relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment within the generalised Phillips curve paradigm. 1 In what follows, I expand on three important ideas that uphold the essential wisdom behind the conquest of in ‡ation in New Zealand within a generalised Phillips curve paradigm.
I do it with two critical objectives. The …rst is to present systematically the theoretical tools necessary for interpreting the slope of the Phillips curve and the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations, which I utilise later to interpret three very distinct episodes of New Zealand's history. The second is to design an empirically relevant theoretical model of the Phillips curve to span the New Zealand data on in ‡ation and unemployment between 1987 and 2015, by allowing for a change in its slope and history speci…c supply shocks.
The Slope of the Phillips Curve
The slope of the Phillips curve informs the policy maker as to the impact of a real demand shock or a monetary policy shock on in ‡ation and unemployment. In particular, a ‡atter Phillips curve implies that a shock to demand or money would cause a relatively large change in unemployment with little associated change in in ‡ation. A steeper Phillips curve implies a large change in in ‡ation with little change in unemployment in response to the same shock.
New Classical Phillips Curve
The simpli…ed new classical Phillips curve (NCPC) follows Lucas (1972) so that the date t in ‡ation rate, t , can be written as the function of the last period's expectation of the current in ‡ation rate, E t 1 t , and a measure of economic slackness. A less controversial and straightforward measure of that slackness is the unemployment-gap, given by the di¤erence between the date t unemployment rate, u t , and its natural rate, u n . In addition, allowing for a time variant supply shock, v t , I write the equation for the NCPC as follows:
where the slope a increases with the relative frequency of demand management policies.
From Lucas (1973) we infer that countries which would try to exploit the Phillips curve relationship more frequently would end up making the Phillips curve steeper. Also, the absence of demand management would make the curve ‡atter. Based on the insights of the original new classical Phillips curve of Lucas (1973) and the subsequent literature on time consistency one conclusion regarding the slope of the Phillips curve follows in a straightforward way. The slope becomes steeper (i.e., a increases) if people perceive that the monetary policy objective is to manage unemployment by accommodating wider variation in the in ‡ation rate rather than the stated objective. Based on the Lucas (1973) supply curve, with a few simplifying assumptions, Romer (1996) derived an explicit formula, connecting the variance of money (a proxy for the frequency of the use of monetary policy) and the slope of the Phillips curve as follows:
where, , V z and V m denote, respectively, an index of disutility from work (as well as the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply) and the two variances of shocks from real demand (z) and money (m) or, by implication, from the variation in the monetary policy instrument. Evidently, a decreases to its minimum if the monetary policy instrument is not used at all and increases with the frequency of its usage. 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve
A di¤erent variation, popularly known as the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), follows the in ‡uential work of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) , Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008) . In the spirit of those models, in the NKPC, the date t in ‡ation rate, t ; is a function of currently expected future in ‡ation rate, E t t+1 , (where the future is discounted at a rate 0 < < 1), the unemployment-gap, (u u n ), and the time varying supply shock v t at date t as follows:
The above relationship has a micro-foundation that arises through the presence of rigidities in price-setting decisions. The higher the in ‡ation expectation prior to the next period for price adjustment, the higher the current price the …rms will set. Such price setting behaviour implies that the current in ‡ation depends on the real cost of production and expected future in ‡ation and that, in turn, implies a negative relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment.
According to proponents of the new Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g., Gali, 2008) , the slope of the Phillips curve is given by
where, denotes the frequency of price changes, denotes the elasticity of output with respect to the labour's share (which positively a¤ects the labour's share of income), denotes the factor for discounting future, denotes the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution across varieties (which positively impacts on the markup or the pro…t share in sales), denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and denotes the Frisch labour supply elasticity .
3
Thus, there is a clear distinction between the new classical and new Keynesian theories regarding how to explain any signi…cant change in the slope of the Phillips curve between any two periods. The new classical theory points toward a change in the frequency of the monetary policy shocks while the new Keynesian theory points toward a change in the deep fundamental parameters of the economy.
I now brie ‡y discuss the ideas of rational expectations, time consistency and credibility which o¤er critical insights for the policymakers to understand the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations.
In ‡ation expectations: Some Theoretical Insights
To understand the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations, atheoretical econometric methods of extracting information from the past proved to be problematic due to a basic conceptual ‡aw: economic policies in ‡uence data and hence past data lose relevance in forecasting the future under new policies. In the literature, we know this problem with econometric forecasting as the Lucas Critique (see, Lucas, 1976) . From that critique emerged the concept of rational expectations of in ‡ation which, by de…nition, coincides with the model's equilibrium in ‡ation outcome, which can plausibly and signi…cantly di¤er from the past trend.
Rational expectations of In ‡ation
Since Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) , economists have realised that monetary policy not only determines in ‡ation but that it also determines the in ‡ation expectation and that, in turn, pins down the location of the entire Phillips curve. Afterwards, the focus turned to modelling expectations and its speci…cation in the equation for the Phillips curve. Two distinct routes emerged subsequently. One involves econometric forecasting techniques while the other follows Friedman's tradition of using theory as a guide to understanding the behaviour of in ‡ation expectations.
A noteworthy illustration of the …rst route (see, e.g., Roberts, 2006) involves conventional econometric techniques where the lags of in ‡ation serve as a proxy for in ‡ation expectations, capturing the presumed inertia of in ‡ation in the data. The alternative route follows the seminal work of Lucas (1972) , which interprets the rational expectation of in ‡ation as the model consistent expectation. The model consistency of in ‡ation expectations requires that the rational agent expects the in ‡ation rate to be the same as the equilibrium outcome of the relevant economic environment which includes, in particular, the agent's belief about the nature of the monetary policy objective.
Despite subsequent di¤erences in modelling the economy, both new classical and new Keynesian formulations of the Phillips curve incorporate that idea of rational expectations so that the agent's forecast of in ‡ation a¤ects the equilibrium outcome of in ‡ation itself. 4 In addition, from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) , we know that if the policy objective is not time consistent then the equilibrium outcome and hence the rational expectation of in ‡ation would change. Consequently, one important key to bringing the rational in ‡ation expectation down is to ensure the time consistency of the objective of a low in ‡ation target.
Time Consistency
According to the rational expectations paradigm, when forming their expectations of future in ‡ation, people optimally use all the information they consider relevant to determine if the monetary policy objective is time consistent. Therefore, to understand the behaviour of in ‡ation expectations in New Zealand, we must examine how important changes in the political environment may tamper with public perception of the time consistency of the monetary policy objective. To keep our focus on the essential details, I assume that the government policy re ‡ects the political preference of a clearly identi…able interest group.
Suppose that the objective of one group is to minimise the long-run in ‡ation rate while the objective of the opposing group is to pursue activist policies to reduce ‡uc-tuations in unemployment and nominal exchange rates even if that requires accepting greater short term ‡uctuations in the in ‡ation rate. A large ‡uctuation in the nominal exchange rate may be undesirable to a political group which prefers a …xed exchange rate regime. Similarly, a powerful interest group representing labour may push for lower unemployment following a deep recession with an easy monetary policy.
Assuming the common knowledge that the real exchange rate is independent of monetary policy, changes in the nominal exchange rate in percentage can be simply attributed to the di¤erence between the domestic and foreign in ‡ation rate.
5 Depending upon the institutional set up for separating political in ‡uence of the interest groups and the monetary authority, the two separate objectives could be described as to minimise, respectively, the following two cost (C) functions: 4 The original idea of rational expectation follows from two articles by John Muth: "Optimal Properties of Exponentially Weighted Forecasts", 1960, and "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements", 1961. 5 By de…nition, the following relationship involving the nominal (e) and the real (q) exchange rates and the domestic ( ) and the foreign ( ) in ‡ation rates holds:
Following a domestic or foreign monetary policy shock the real exchange rate q remains unchanged (i.e., 4q = 0) and, therefore, the nominal rate e changes as follows: 
or
where and denote, respectively, the domestic and the foreign in ‡ation rates, u c = (u u n ) measures the cyclical unemployment rate. For expositional simplicity, I drop the subscript t and assume that the parameter a measuring the disliking of unemployment equals the slope of the Phillips curve in (1) -(4) and the common parameter b > 0 measures, respectively, group one's disliking of in ‡ation and its opposition's disliking of in ‡ation di¤erentials with the country's trading partners. After simplifying the notation for the expected in ‡ation to E , it follows from (1): u c = 1 a ( E ) and, in turn, from (6):
It is straightforward to conclude that the …rst group's objective is time consistent while the second group's objective is not. Next, I provide a brief outline of that argument.
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Suppose initially the economy is at a state of a long-run equilibrium with = 0 and, therefore, the rational expectation of in ‡ation E = 0. The cost of the two policy objectives under the above economic condition are as follows: C 1 = 0 and C 2 (initial) = b 2 2 > 0: Clearly, for the …rst group the policy cost equals the minimum possible value. However, for the second group that is not the case. The optimal in ‡ation rate that minimises the policy cost for the second group satis…es
If the government reneges its promise to set = OP T while the in ‡ation expectation e = 0 then the new cyclical unemployment rate u c would be :
and by reneging as above it can bring down its cost C 2 to a lower level so that:
In other words, once the in ‡ation rate is anchored at E = 0 possibly through a decade of hard work to increase credibility, the objective function of the second group provides the government an incentive to cheat. Not only their political preference would encourage their representative government to renege on its promise but the key idea of time consistency is that, even if it does not, rational agents would expect the government to do just that. Consequently, the rational expectations of in ‡ation would be revised upward so that E = OP T > 0 and that would imply u c = 0 and the new value of C 2 (new) = 1 2b
Worse still, if the second group fails to understand the inherent time consistency problem with the objective indicated by their publicly declared political preference and nonetheless pursues a policy of zero in ‡ation rate dictated by a law, then the rational expectations of in ‡ation would be above zero, being equal to the optimal in ‡ation rate. Consequently, it would cause an increase in the unemployment rate so that u c = + : No amount of transparency and vigorous pursuit of zero in ‡ation policy would bring the expectations down, until and unless the public's perception of the very policy objective is changed. In other words, as long as people believe that the government dislikes "undesirable ‡uctuations" in unemployment and exchange rates they would rationally expect the government to renege from the promise of a zero in ‡ation target. It would be true especially if, in a situation like the global …nancial crisis, foreign governments follow a lax monetary policy which may increase , causing appreciation of the nominal currency. The rational agents would expect the government, which tries to minimise C 2 , to increase the in ‡ation rate.
Clearly, the …rst group's policy objective of minimising C 1 is time consistent. Therefore, to overcome the problem of time consistency, it is necessary that people believe that the government re ‡ects the preference of the …rst group. An independent central bank can help but is not su¢ cient.
The Minister of Finance, who is a political person, appoints the Governor and in‡uences the Governor's objective by changing the Policy Targets Agreements (PTA) between them. Sometimes, a close relative of the Minister serves as an adviser to the Governor. 7 Irrespective of the integrity and the professionalism of the individuals concerned, such close association could tamper with the public perception or the credibility of the monetary policy objective. Similarly, the public expressions of the uneasiness with the tight in ‡ation targetting objective by the Minister of Finance could also undermine the credibility of in ‡ation targeting.
Passing a law to increase credibility like the RBNZ Act of 1989 certainly helps but the rational expectations of in ‡ation ultimately depends on the public perception of the political in ‡uence of the government as a whole. Therefore, the political character of the whole government is at stake here for increasing credibility which, in turn, enhances monetary policy e¤ectiveness.
Credibility
A large volume of theoretical literature on reputation and credibility of the policymaker emerged from the seminal work of Barro and Gordon (1983) and the in ‡uential work of Goodfriend and King (2005) . The idea of credibility helped to build a consensus among economists around the world that not only does the central bank need to enjoy full autonomy over all its instruments to implement its objective but the public's perception of this objective also should not di¤er from the o¢ cially stated one.
With reference to the two policy objectives discussed above, if people believe that with a probability p the government's objective is to minimise C 1 while with probability (1 p) it is to minimise C 2 then their perception of the government's monetary policy objective becomes to minimise C = pC 1 + (1 p)C 2 . Consequently, irrespective of a transparently written legislation, if a newly elected government undertakes speci…c decisions that make p < 1 then such a policy would also su¤er from a time consistency problem. In essence, the condition p < 1 is su¢ cient to cause a loss of credibility. Consequently, a zero in ‡ation target would ironically yield the worst possible outcome in that environment. The work of Goodfriend and King (2005) supports the conjecture that the public uncertainty about p could easily add avoidable cost of pursuing a low in ‡ation policy, implying the importance of credibility of the monetary regime in ensuring without any confusion that p = 1.
It follows, therefore, that setting up a …xed in ‡ation target and a clear rule for meeting that target, however transparently followed, is not su¢ cient to anchor in ‡ation expectations. The overall commitment of the whole government and its politics must be consistent with a stable in ‡ation outcome in the economy. To ensure such an outcome, economic literacy of the majority of the electorate would be critically important as well. Failure to do such preparation prior to introducing a policy of sharp disin ‡ation would rationally force an economy to sacri…ce valuable output, causing avoidable su¤ering among the people.
The disin ‡ation decision in New Zealand in the late 1980s and the experience of the country afterwards provides a salient illustration of that point.
A Narrative History of In ‡ation Expectations in New Zealand
In the late 1980s, the RBNZ faced the prospect of reducing in ‡ation from its peak of about …fteen percent to a zone between zero to two per cent as speci…ed by the RBNZ Act 1989. The conventional wisdom, based on Samuelson and Solow (1960) , described a rigid trade o¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment. Dalziel (1989) and others warned about the inevitable cost of disin ‡ation in terms of lost output due to increased unemployment from such a sudden and drastic disin ‡ation. 8 Bollard (1992) made a reference to "a rather naive view" of "a relatively painless outcome" (see page 5, second paragraph) and suggested that the new monetary policy incorporated "the new classical view of expectations" (see page 11, second paragraph). The new classical hypothesis of short-run neutrality of money with rational expectations and the consequent zero sacri…ce ratio was considered more radical than the monetarists'view of the temporary cost of disin ‡ation. Coleman's (1992) survey of opinions reveal that contemporary economists in New Zealand largely supported or opposed the disin ‡ation decision of the late 1980s based primarily on their views regarding the monetarist's neutrality proposition and its implication for unemployment, ignoring the new classical view of rational expectations altogether.
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Prior to 1989, none of the RBNZ publications explicitly referred to the contemporary theories of rational expectations following Lucas (1972) . The novelty of the idea of rational expectations is that it identi…es in ‡ation expectations with the sustainable outcome of in ‡ation which is a function of the overall policy framework of the government, not to be equated with a temporary in ‡ation outcome. Reddell and Heppleston (1988) stood out as an exception to this rule. They emphasised the importance of bringing the in ‡ation expectations down by taking a broader range of mutually consistent policies rather than merely focussing on the monetary aggregates alone. Consequently, the perils of bringing in ‡ation down prior to lowering its expectations were ignored and, ironically, celebrated. The February 1992 Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) noted without warning that in 1991 the CPI in ‡ation rate reached a thirty year low of one percent which was signi…cantly below its stated forecast made in MPS (1991). Considering high in ‡ation expectations, on 19 December 1990, the Minister of Finance issued a new Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) to postpone the target date for achieving the zero in ‡ation target by one full year (see, page 18, MPS, 1991). Moreover, the MPS 1992 included its assessment that the in ‡ation expectations for 1992 to exceed three percent but it o¤ered no warning against pursuing an in ‡ation target below its expectations. What happened afterwards o¤ered clear insights for the policy makers. Figure 1 below displays a spectacular graph apparently mimicking the PhillipsSamuelson-Solow hypothesis of a rigid in ‡ation-unemployment trade-o¤ between 1987 and 1992. It plots the in ‡ation rate using the GDP de ‡ator because of its natural link 8 Dalziel (1998) provides a comprehensive summary of the contemporary thoughts regarding the conventional wisdom on the likely adverse impact of disin ‡ation. 9 Coleman's (1992) survey of opinions among the economists concluded that a considerable majority of economists believed that there is no long run trade o¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment (see page 52) and that "the younger economists are . . . less likely to disagree with the money-neutrality thesis" (see, page 56) which implies a relatively costless disin ‡ation. The survey result shows that about a quarter of the respondents generally agreed with the premise (32) of monetarism that shortterm cost in the economy through the "liquidity-e¤ect", presumably following a disin ‡ation, would be negligible (see footnote 7, page 52).
to the underlying theory of the Phillips curve without in ‡ation expectations. 10 Evidently, the disin ‡ation in the early 1990s came with a sharp and signi…cant increase in unemployment. However, the data since 1993 poses a puzzle to the original Phillips hypothesis where in ‡ation expectations play no role.
If, instead, we follow Friedman's (1968) insight to consider the expectation augmented generalised paradigm for the Phillips curve, then we can potentially explain such a sharp increase in unemployment by a rapid disin ‡ation that surpassed the public expectations between 1987 and 1992. Also, the steady decline of the unemployment rate afterwards without a corresponding increase in the in ‡ation rate can be explained by a steady decline in the in ‡ation expectations till 1999. Finally, the increased volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment since the 2000s may be explained by the increased volatility of the rational in ‡ation expectation itself.
Figure 1
A question arises naturally: can we …nd evidence from the data on in ‡ation expectations or present theories relevant to the narrative history to support those hypotheses? To answer this question we begin with the application of the the theory of credibility and its impact on the rational expectations of in ‡ation followed by an empirical analysis of the data on in ‡ation expectations. : 1987-1992 During the period 1987-1992 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand brought down the in ‡ation rate drastically. Yet, the real product wages, calculated as mean nominal hourly earnings de ‡ated by the Producers Price Index (PPI), which measures the labour cost of employers, rose between 1984 and 1994-by about 4 percent (see, Dixon, 1996 , page 53, …rst paragraph), implying downward nominal wage rigidity. The data of commercial forecasting …rms on in ‡ation expectations show that expected in ‡ation remained higher than in ‡ation justifying this wage rigidity. Between the end of 1987 and the end of 1992, the in ‡ation expectations remained two to seven percent higher than the actual in ‡ation rate, except for the four consecutive quarters around the period when the RBNZ Act 1989 was passed.
Rational Inertia of Expectation
One can explain such a staggering decline of in ‡ation expectations along the line of Mankiw and Reis (2002) by arguing that learning about the new policy regime typically requires costly reallocation of resources and hence, during the time of big changes, people update expectations at a relatively slow pace. One can also refer to Gordon (1997) to suggest that, believing in the inherent "in ‡ation inertia", …rms and workers may sign contracts expecting high rates of in ‡ation in the future. Such contracts raise the labour cost unexpectedly to cause a sharp increase in unemployment. However, those explanations appear lame for making sense of the data after 1993. This is because, in the post 1993 era New Zealand witnessed a steady decline of the unemployment rate till 1997 without any signi…cant change in the in ‡ation rate, suggesting that the pace of adujustment for in ‡ation expectation was much faster than the theories based on costly adjustment of expectation would allow.
The rational expectations view, contrary to Gordon (1997) , denies that there is any inherent momentum to the present process of in ‡ation. Instead, this view insists that people expect high rates of in ‡ation in the future precisely because the labour market condition along with the government's prospective monetary and …scal policies warrant those expectations. In particular, the rational expectation of in ‡ation coincides with the long-run in ‡ation outcome of the underlying economy and not necessarily with the current in ‡ation. It also assumes that the cost of processing information in a transparent environment is negligible.
Consequently, according to the rational expectation view, the independence and transparency of the central bank's operative procedure was not enough to convince people that the low in ‡ation target would be sustainable in the long-run. Several political and economic factors stood in its way.
First, according to Evans et al., (1996) , those reforms were quite drastic, which arguably changed "a closed and centrally controlled economy to one of the most open countries in the OECD." Those drastic institutional changes raised sharp political controversies o¤ering serious challenges to their long-term viability.
Second, Evans et al., (1996) concluded that the sequencing of those reforms were "suboptimal" for the intended outcome of low in ‡ation (see page 1871, 2nd column, 2nd paragraph). The labour market and …scal reforms should have preceded the monetary reform.
Hall (1996) concluded that deregulation of labour markets prior to the introduction of the RBNZ ACT of 1989 would have reduced the cost of disin ‡ation (see chapter 2 in Silverstone et al., page 61, third para, lines 2-4). Presumably, the rational mind believed that an economy with strong labour market frictions due to the close link between the award wages and the negotiated Metal Trades Award would make it hard for the RBNZ to sustain low in ‡ation for a long-period of time.
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The much celebrated "Growth Agreement" between the New Zealand Government and the Council of Trade Unions to limit the growth of nomimal wage to two percent plus productivity growth was only indicative, for the lack of a centralized implementation mechanism. By re ‡ecting on the o¢ cial monetary policy statements, Johnson (1990) noted such limited control over wage in ‡ation and mounting external debt as two important policy challenges.
By 1987, the public debt rose to seventy-six per cent of the GDP with almost half of it held by the non-taxpaying foreigners. Only after the completion of all major …scal reforms, both numbers fell by more than …fty per cent. Prior to that change, a sudden reduction of in ‡ation could risk increasing the real burden of that debt beyond feasibility. Therefore, following Sargent and Wallace (1981), one could not rule out this perceived …scal risk for high in ‡ation without the necessary …scal reform. I …nd an implicit support for the above argument in Wheeler's (2014) comment that "there are limits to what monetary policy can do: supportive structural and …scal policies are also needed".
Third, the …nancial crisis of 1984 led to a sudden and signi…cant depreciation of the New Zealand dollar which was severe enough to make news even for the farmers in Iowa whose exports compete with their New Zealand counterpart. 12 The panic that followed afterwards continued to provide a reason for the public's concern for an uncertain future for the value of the New Zealand dollar and the expectation of a higher in ‡ation due to a higher expected price for imports.
Fourth, in 1989, the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) for the …rst time ever in New Zealand's history did not help to lower in ‡ation expectations either.
Therefore, the sluggish decline of in ‡ation expectations in this era seems rational, if we consider the speci…c economic environment in which the RBNZ's ability (not just the declared intent) to sustain a low in ‡ation target lacked credibility. : 1993-1999 Even to the sceptics, the conquest of in ‡ation appeared decisive by the end of 1993. By that time reforms, complementary to in ‡ation targeting, were all but completed. Then unemployment began returning home to its natural rate of four per cent (see Figure 1) . 13 Presumably, as Figure 2 below suggests, a gradual decrease of the in ‡ation expectations over time allowed the economy to enjoy lower unemployment without any increase in in ‡ation, consistent with the models (1) and (3).
A Period of Increased Credibility

Figure 2
Thus, this outcome was possible without a rejection of the Phillips curve. A narrative history helps us here with potential reasons for such steady decline of in ‡ation expectations. 14 In particular, the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) of 1991 reduced labour market frictions which helped to generate disin ‡ation in wages. 15 The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) of 1994 reassured the employers and the workers about no implicit pressure on the RBNZ arising from any future burden of debt to be …nanced via in ‡ation.
13 Razzak (2014) concluded that the measured long-term unemployment rate has been around four percent. The unemployment rate did sharply increase after the RBNZ ACT of 1989 and came down eventually to its original state of about four percent and stayed there till the global …nancial crisis (GFC) hit in 2007.
14 In Figure 2 , I plot the quarterly data on one-year-ahead in ‡ation forecast from the ANZ Business Outlook Survey of …rms.
15 Rosenberg (2010) concluded that wage disin ‡ation accelerated in the post ECA era to reduce the elasticity of the wage rate relative to labour productivity signi…cantly from 0. 37 (1990 -1997) to 0.14 (1997-2000) .
Trade liberalisation facilitated global competition and that too put downward pressure on in ‡ation. Also, Evans et al, (1996) noted that successful applications of modern microeconomic theories into various policy designs augmented overall e¢ ciency as well as labour productivity. They reported about an eighty per cent increase in the hours based on the average productivity growth between the period 1984 -1991 and 1991 -1995 (see page 1881, Table 2 ). Those productivity gains were likely to lower the cost of production and increased the credibility of a sustainable low in ‡ation target in the long run.
Afterwards, the increased credibility, achieved through the supportive economic reforms, caused in ‡ation expectations to decline steadily till September 1999. Figure  2 shows that this steady decline in the in ‡ation expectations occured despite a sharp increase in the oil price in ‡ation between 1998 and 1999. More importantly, Figure 2 suggests that throughout this period in ‡ation expections were much less succeptible to oil price in ‡ation than the actual in ‡ation. The correlation of the oil price in ‡ation was only 0.26 with the ANZ in ‡ation expectations compared to 0.36 with the CPI in ‡ation during the period 1993 -1999. This apparent divorce between the oil price in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations supports Bernanke's (2010) conclusion that a successful anchoring of in ‡ation expectations, achieved through a credible low in ‡ation targeting objective, causes the death of high in ‡ation or de ‡ation.
With in ‡ation expectations anchored, according to the Phillips curve hypothesis, shocks to supply and demand would respectively generate a positive and negative trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment in the short run. However, as long as the monetary policy regime remains credible, the in ‡ation rate would return to the same rate as its anchored expectation, while the unemployment rate returns to its natural rate.
Loss of Credibility and Missing Disin ‡ation: 1999-2015
Yet, the absence of a contemporaneous correlation between in ‡ation and unemployment in the post 1999 period, especially in response to a demand shock such as the one during the recent GFC, poses a puzzle for the hypothesis of anchored expectation within the context of the Phillips curve paradigm.
Moreover, a comparison of Figure 2 (above) and Figure 3 (below) suggests a greater volatility of in ‡ation expectations and its stronger comovements with the oil price in ‡ation, compared to the previous era of increased credibility between 1993 and 1999.
In particular, the coe¢ cient of variation (measured by the ratio of variance to the square of the mean) for the in ‡ation expectations and in ‡ation increased by more than two hundred per cent and one thousand per cent, respectively, while the same for the oil price in ‡ation increased only by about seventy-three per cent. Also, the corelation of the oil price in ‡ation with the ANZ in ‡ation expectations increased sharpy by about 50% from only 0.26 during the previous era between 1993 and 1999 to about 0.39 in the post-1999 era. Interestingly, during the same time period, the correlation between the oil price in ‡ation and the CPI in ‡ation remained about the same as before, indicating a signi…cant increase in the succeptibility of the in ‡ation expectations to external shocks in the latter period. More interestingly, the sharp increase in the in ‡ation expectations in 2001 and 2002 despite a steady decline in the oil price between 2000 and 2002 suggests a separate cause for this increased in ‡ation expectation and poses an apparent puzzle to Bernanke's (2010) anchored in ‡ation expectation hypothesis and hence its relevance to the New Zealand economy in the post-1999 era.
Figure 3
It seems that there are two ways to rationalise this puzzle. One way would be to hypothesise that the loss of credibility in the post 1999 era unanchored in ‡ation expectations. An alternative way would be to assume that the Phillips curve has ‡attened (see, e.g., IMF 2013 and McDormet, 2014) or has lost its relevance along the line of Ball and Mazumder (2011) .
A ‡atter Phillips curve does indeed help explain the phenomenon of "missing disin ‡ation" but not the puzzle of increased volatility of in ‡ation and its expectation. Besides, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) argued that a theoretical explanation for a ‡attening of the Phillips curve is problematic, especially in the new Keynesian model. It requires speci…c structural changes implied by (4) in a way that I …nd inconsistent with New Zealand's history during this era. More importantly, empirical evidence, presented later, suggests that the the slope of the Phillips curves became steeper (not ‡atter) during this era, compared to the previous era of increased credibility. Also, Lucas's (1973) rationale for the slope, given by (2), provides a plausible explanation.
It involves the public perception of an increased frequency of monetary policy shocks relative to non-monetary demand shocks.
However, the sudden and signi…cant increase in the frequency of monetary shocks in the decade after 1999, despite a decade of successful anchoring of the in ‡ation expectations earlier, calls for an explanation. A careful study of Quiggin (2000) and Reddell (2016) suggests that there is an obvious explanation for this change; but it is not economic but political.
Perhaps due to a lagged political response to the costly disin ‡ation which resulted immediately after the RBNZ Act 1989, coupled with the lack of complete understanding of the deeper theoretical ideas involving rational expectations, time consistency and credibility that produced an economy with low in ‡ation and low unemployment, in 1999 the electorate demanded revisions of the "radical free market reforms" and the newly elected government pledged to roll back some of them.
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Tampering with the original reforms also tampered with credibility of the low in‡ation target, because together those reforms ensured the credibility of the RBNZ's ability to sustain its low in ‡ation target. For example, the new Employment Relations Act of 2002 which replaced ECA 1991 to give labour unions more bargaining power arguably created more wage frictions in the labour market.
17 Also, immediately after the election victory, the Minister of Finance revealed his not so strict preference for the exclusive pursuit of a low in ‡ation target at the cost of a higher volatility of unemployment and output. In particular, the December 1999 PTA made explicit the requirement for the RBNZ to seek to avoid "unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and exchange rate" in the pursuit of a low in ‡ation target. Also, to support that change in focus, the Minister lifted the upper limit of the targeted zone for in ‡ation by one full percentage point while keeping the lower limit unchanged. This asymmetry in tampering with the targeted zone arguably revealed a new upward bias in the preferred in ‡ation target.
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It did not stop there. In September 2002, even the lower limit for the in ‡ation target was raised from zero to one per cent. Reddell (2016) reported that "the Minister of Finance, Michael Cullen, had been uneasy for a long time as to whether the target framework was too restrictive." He also recalled that the new Governor chosen by the 16 Quiggin (2000) cited Bean (1999) to note that the RBNZ's "exclusive focus on an in ‡ation targets have led to excessively restrictive policy" and 1999 election result was a verdict against such "radical free market reforms" and "the Labour government pledged to roll back" some of those reforms. (see, page 35).
17 Rosenberg (2010) found that the elasticity of real wage growth relative to labour productivity growth increased by more than …fty per cent during the period 2000 -2006 compared to the period 1997 -2000. He attributed this increase to the ERA 2002.
18 Bean (1999) argued that a policy that limits itself to in ‡ation targeting alone must accept a greater volatility of output and unemployment. Therefore, to reduce volatility of unemployment, the policymakers must allow for "ample ‡uctuations in in ‡ation" and accept a longer lasting divergence of in ‡ation from its target. The 1999 changes in the PTA seem consistent with Bean's (1999) recommendations.
new Minister of Finance "had much the same unease about how the Bank had been run -and about the anti-in ‡ation inclinations of key personnel -as the Beehive did." He argued that possibly because of such "continuing unease" the Minister added to the PTA the explicit requirement for the Governor to mind output and exchange rate stabilizations.
The RBNZ Memo (2005) provides evidence of this shift in monetary policy preference toward including a desire to stabilise the value of the NZD. 19 Cheng, et al. (2006) , in a New Zealand Herald article with a title: "Avoid kiwi dollar, Government tells Japanese", wrote that a spokesman for the Minister of Finance con…rmed that a joint delegation from the RBNZ and the Treasury had been to Japan in late 2005 to dissuade them from using the New Zealand dollar denominated Uridashi bonds as a part of their portfolio of savings. The article also reported that "Federated Farmers board-member Hugh Ritchie was concerned about the Government intervening to in ‡uence the dollar."
More importantly, as Reddell (2016) noted, the rationale behind the …rst few OCR decisions appeared confusing. In a large economy like the United States, an interest rate hike is likely to reduce in ‡ation and its expectation; but it is also likely to increase the value of its currency. In a small open economy like New Zealand, an interest rate hike may also ironically boost liquidity signi…cantly by attracting NZD from the international market via Uridashi or other NZD denominated bonds. Therefore, the OCR decisions, which also started since 1999, contributed to confusions regarding the monetary policy objectives, especially when their rationale appeared incosistent with in ‡ation targeting.
The direct evidence of such confusion comes from a question put to the Minister of Finance by the opposition leader at that time, Honourable John Key, regarding the RBNZ Governor's description of the exchange rate "as exceptionally and unjusti…ably high" at a time when his own policy of raising interest rates was likely to attract "billions of dollars of hot money" via "Uridashi and Eurokiwi" bonds into the country (see, New Zealand Parliament Speeches, 2005, Dec 8). Key (2005) argued that such a scenario was also likely to fuel in ‡ation rate because a higher interest rate would attract more liquidity from abroad. Other political leaders such as the United Future leader Peter Dunne and the ACT party leader Rodney Hide expressed similar concern related to a confusing monetary policy stance. Three years later the Governor of the RBNZ and the Treasury Head went on a roadshow around the world with an opposite mission to encourage in ‡ow of New Zealand dollars from abroad (see, Fallow, 2009). It was soon after the Governor lowered the interest rate sharply at home, plausibly to combat recession, which ironically undermined that e¤ort, creating additional confusion. 20 As 19 The December 2005 Uridashi memo includes a graph suggesting that the RBNZ is concerned about high value of the NZD. Yet, a high NZD is ironically good for keeping in ‡ation low. The root of this concern must be a new objective and there lies the evidence of a policy trade-o¤ between the volatility of the NZD versus the in ‡ation rate. 20 Sanderson, et al. (2007) wrote a memo on behalf of the Business and Economic Research Limited the confusion regarding the monetary policy objective grew, its credibility su¤ered. Consequently, the rational expectations of in ‡ation became more volatile. Lewis and McDermott (2016) report econometric evidence of a clear increase in in ‡ation expectations immediately after the explicit changes in the in ‡ation targets in the PTA of 1999. Also, in a recent speech, Wheeler (2014) noted that the global stimulus package and New Zealand's loose …scal policy, and the latest PTAs guideline for the Governor of the RBNZ to seek in ‡ation in the medium term rather than short term made the in ‡ation rate more volatile and prone to supply shocks. However, he concluded that policy credibility achieved through increased transparency has stabilised (or anchored) in ‡ation expectations at a low level and that anchoring of expectations enhanced "the ability of monetary policy to help o¤set short-term shocks to output and employment". Yet, Figure 3 above casts some doubt over the hypothesis of an anchored expectation. Instead, it seems that the volatility of oil price in ‡ation contaminated its volatility to in ‡ation expectations more prominently in the post 1999 era than in the nineties. Conceivably, signi…cant changes in the PTAs in 1999 and afterwards might have undermined the very credibility of the monetary policy objective to make in ‡a-tion expectations more sensitive to external shocks. Ironically, credibility is necessary for anchoring the in ‡ation expectations at a low level but any attempt to exploit the in ‡ation-unemployment trade-o¤ for demand management following the original Phillips-Samuelson-Solow hypothesis may adversely a¤ect the policy trade-o¤ by making the Phillips curve itself steeper. That is the essence of the Lucas Critique. Also, if in ‡ation expectations are no longer anchored due to lost credibility and are susceptible to external shocks then a temporary period of low in ‡ation expectations due to an external shock provides little assurance of credibility, contrary to Wheeler's (2014) conjecture. Ironically, the Governor's recent stance on monetary policy "to help o¤set" the demand shock from the GFC may cause stag ‡ation by raising in ‡ation expectation.
Moreover, the average in ‡ation expectation might have already increased in the last few years as the survey data of …rms in New Zealand reported in Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Kumar (2014) indicated. According to the possible explanation for such an increase could be the rise in oil prices, the recent growth of China and the unprecedented volume of quantitative easing following the global …nancial crisis. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that had the monetary policy of low in ‡ation targeting remained credible, then those outside in ‡uences would not have raised the rational expectations of in ‡ation so easily.
In the following section I report results from my estimation of the Phillips curve and tests of relevant hypotheses to examine if the insights o¤ered by the narrative history of events are compatible with those empirics.
(BERL) expressing concern about the RBNZ's conduct of monetary policy. The memo noted that the high interest rate policy may ironically fuel in ‡ation by attracting "foreign funds into New Zealand Dollar deposits," and thereby "increasing New Zealand's domestic money supply."
The Phillips Curve Empirics for New Zealand
From the earlier discussions, I make four conjectures: (i) credibility matters for understanding the pace and direction of changes in the rational in ‡ation expectations; (ii) within a credible regime with anchored in ‡ation expectations demand shocks generate a contemporaneous negative tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and unemployment as predicted by the generalised Phillips curve paradigm; (iii) supply shocks and changes in in ‡ation expectations shift the location of the Phillips curve without changing its slope; and (iv) the loss of credibility leaves the policymaker with a steeper Phillips curve whose location shifts more frequently.
I follow a new style advocated by Leeper et al. (2008) in which the narrative history interpreted by relevant theory can be used to partition the available data to discern insightful facts from regression based exercises. The …ndings from this exercise uncover the in ‡ation-unemployment dynamics through a generalised Phillips curve paradigm, despite the puzzling lack of evidence for such a relationship (see, for example, Hargreaves et al., 2006, and McDermott, 2015) .
Data
The empirical work includes data and research assistance from various people. Together, we consider two alternative sources for the survey data on expectations but primarily rely on the longer and clearer data series from the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ). In particular, we use the data generated by the monthly ANZ Business Outlook Survey of …rms from the answer to the following question: what does the survey respondent expect the annual in ‡ation rate (as measured by the consumer price index) to be in the next twelve months'time? In order to obtain the quarterly data required for this research, we take the average of the values for the three corresponding months belonging to each quarter, beginning from June 1986 through December 2015. The RBNZ M14 data series provides an alternative source for the quarterly data on in ‡ation expectations from September 1987 onwards. We examine the one year out expected in ‡ation data for our study. The RBNZ M13 data series for the household expectations provides another source for in ‡ation expectations but it represents a much shorter series as it begins from March 1995 and, therefore, turns out to be unsuitable for answering questions of this paper.
We note that even though the ANZ survey data is collected monthly, the in ‡ation expectations variable is de…ned as the expectation of the annual CPI in ‡ation rate for the year ahead. The RBNZ, on the other hand, provides the CPI data on a quarterly basis. To create a larger dataset for our regression analysis, we use the annual in ‡ation expectations data on a quarterly basis and calculate the annual in ‡ation rate for each quarter q using the RBNZ data.
In particular, for the period ranging between June 1986 and December 2015, we use the quarterly data on the CPI for each quarter q to calculate the year to year in ‡ation rate t;q , by measuring the percentage change in the value of the CP I between the year t 1 and t, beginning and ending at that quarter q such that t;q CP I t ; q CP I t 1;q CP I t 1;q 100:
We also examine the non-tradable component of the CPI in ‡ation rate for which I found June 1999 through December 2015 quarterly data from the "CPI Non-Standard Tradable & Non-tradable Component Series," provided by Statistics New Zealand. Additional data from March 1993 through March 1999 came from the RBNZ statistician Ian McIlraith, as the best estimates available for that period.
The quarterly data for the oil price in ‡ation rate is also generated in the same way to ensure the consistency of the model. We compile the oil price data from the series "DCOILWTICO" provided by the United States Energy Information Administration from the beginning of the year 1986. The units of the …gures are US dollars per barrel. We …rst compute the quarterly average to determine the mean oil price for the quarter and then for each quarter we take the previous year to current year annual percentage changes to determine the oil price in ‡ation rate for the year ended with that quarter.
For data on unemployment, we use the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for that quarter q from the June 2015 and December 2015 publications of Statistics New Zealand. 
Empirical Methodology
First, I describe how my methodology relates to a few relevant earlier works on the estimation of the Phillips curve. Second, I present key …ndings from selected regressions which are most useful for answering the key questions for this paper. Hargreaves et al. (2006) used quarterly data from 1992 to 2005 and estimated the in ‡ation rate on alternative models of the Phillips curve involving the survey data on in ‡ation expectations, the lagged in ‡ation rate and a combination of output gap and its lags as key explanatory variables. They also separately reviewed tradable and non-tradable in ‡ation rates and reported a reasonable …t for their Phillips curve with in ‡ation measured by the non-tradable component of the CPI. The work of Paloviita (2005 Paloviita ( , 2008 , Kuttnerner and Robinson (2010) , Koop and Onorante (2012) and included equations similar to (1) and (3).
As a measure of economic slackness Hargreaves et al.(2006) , Paloviita (2005 Paloviita ( , 2008 and Kuttnerner and Robinson (2010) used the GDP gap, while Coibion and Gorod-nichenko (2015) used the unemployment gap. Both gaps are unobservable. Yet, the theory behind the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) is relatively intuitive and straightforward to estimate from the data. 22 The GDP gap, on the other hand, may be an artefact of detrending the data and hence may be ill-suited for estimating the Phillips curve. This is because the model requires an estimate of the GDP gap relative to the ‡exible price output, which has no theoretical link with the popularly used low pass …lter without a theoretically speci…ed trend for the ‡exible price output.
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I limit my focus to the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. Estimates with a lagged in ‡ation rate (as a proxy for in ‡ation expectations) were insigni…cant and hence I do not report them. Besides, the use of past data as a proxy for expectations of the future is subject to the Lucas Critique.
I use a quarterly model for all the variables but the annual measure of in ‡ation. I do that to generate a large number of data while, at the same time, to ensure the consistency of the time periods covered by the expected in ‡ation term relative to that covered by the actual in ‡ation. The temporal aggregation gives us the empirical models of analysis based on the original speci…cations (1) and (3) of the new classical and new Keynesian speci…cations, respectively, as follows:
and
where, (9) gives the de…nition of the annual in ‡ation rate t;q for the year 't'ending in the quarter 'q'.
Clearly such temporal aggregation induces moving average errors (at least, depending on the properties of the original errors) and this impacts the regression via serial dependence but no endogeneity e¤ects since there are no lags in the system for generating data. So the use of HAC estimators like Newey West addresses the complications due to serial dependent errors. 24 A standard Breusch Godfrey autocorrelation test supported the use the Newey West standard errors with a bandwidth set to 3 for determining signi…cance.
25 22 The mid-point of Razzak's (2014) estimates for the NRU is four per cent which I use for this study but allow a possible change in it due to the GFC, since December 2007.
23 Kuttner and Robinson (2010) had a similar concern and cited the work of Neiss and Nelson (2005) in this regard.
24 Hansen and Hodrick (1980) proposed a method for accounting for this induced serial dependence in the error term. Their method was the precursor to Newey and West (1987) . 25 An alternative approach would be to annualize the quarterly in ‡ation rate by quadrupling it but that would create an obvious inconsistency betwen this measure of the in ‡ation rate and the measure of the in ‡ation expectations compiled from the ANZ survey data. In any case, the key …nding is robust to this alternative measure and I provide additional information in the Appendix to support that claim.
Regression Results
Next, I present robust evidence for (a) the existence of the new classical Phillips curve modelled by (1), (b) a plausible rational expectation hypothesis for the Phillips curve with a constant slope, and (c) a steeper slope of the Phillips curve in the post 1999 era, especially if we consider the nontradable component of the CPI in ‡ation rate. Surprisingly, I also …nd that the use of the nontradable component of the CPI for calculating the in ‡ation rates yields a stronger support for the conclusions (a) -(c) and provides new insights on the plausible increase in the natural rate of unemployment (NRU).
Evidence for the Phillips Curve in New Zealand
Following the recent work of , I use the two popular speci…cations described by (1) and (3) but without assuming that the data of in ‡ation expectations re ‡ects rational expectations. 26 Instead, I use the ANZ's survey data of in ‡ation expectations that directly a¤ects in ‡ation. Table 1 summarises the …ndings. In each quarter q, the term E t 1 t;q in (10) refers to the one year lagged expectation of the annual in ‡ation rate t;q measured for that quarter q while the term E t;q [ t+1;q ] in (11) refers to the expectation in quarter q about the one-year-ahead annual in ‡ation rate t+1;q . The di¤erence between the unemployment rate u q in quarter q and the natural rate of unemployment u n measures the unemployment gap in quarter q. In the regressions based on the full sample of data, the relatively high signi…cance of the estimates for the unemployment gap and their theoretically correct sign in (1) and (5) validates the Phillip's curve under both the new classical model (NCM) and the new Keynesian model (NKM). However, in the sub-samples the NCM provides a stronger support than the NKM for the Phillips curve hypothesis.
In Table 1 , the columns (1) - (4) show that under the new classical speci…cation, the estimates for the slope of the Phillips curve are unambiguously negative, consistent with the Phillips curve hypothesis. They are also signi…cant at the one percent level in the full sample as well as in all subsamples but (4). However, the columns (5) - (8) reveal that under the new Keynesian speci…cation the same conclusion holds only for the full sample period and for the subsample period 1993-1999 of increased credibility. Therefore, I conclude that strong empirical support for the Phillips curve hypothesis arises primarily through the new classical speci…cation.
Plausibility of the Rational Expectation Based Phillips Curve
Next, following the new classical speci…cation (1), I restrict the co-e¢ cient of the in ‡ation expectation E t 1;q [ t;q ] variable to be one, assuming that it re ‡ects the rational expectation equilibrium in ‡ation rate for the economic environment which includes the public's perception regarding the monetary policy objective function. I do that because such a formulation closely resembles the original Lucas (1973) representation of a relationship between the "in ‡ation surprise" ( t;q E t 1;q [ t;q ]) and the economic slackness which I measure by the "unemployment gap", (u t;q u n ).
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In Table 2 below, I present the estimates with the above restriction. I also include at the bottom of Table 2 , the results from testing the validity of the above restriction, based on the rational expectation assumption, using the output related to the estimates presented in columns (1) - (4) of Table 1 . I conclude that, except for the period 1987-1992, I cannot reject, at the one per cent level of signi…cance, the hypothesis that slope of the in ‡ation expectation is equal to one. The estimated co-e¢ cients of the unemployment gap have the theoretically correct sign and, except for column 4, show a high level of signi…cance and the F-test reveals that we cannot reject the null that the coe¢ cient of the expected in ‡ation rate is unity, except during the period of transition (column 2) marked by declining in ‡ation expectations. Surprisingly, as Table 2 illustrates, contrary to popular belief, the Lucas (1973) type speci…cation generates robust evidence for the existence of the (rational) expectation augmented Phillips curve, except for the sub period 1987 -1992, which is arguably a costly period of learning due to a rapid economic transition. 28 These results are comparable with what was reported in . Therefore, I conclude that the New Zealand data supports the Lucas (1973) speci…cation of the Phillips curve with the rational expectation hypothesis.
Supply Shocks and Changes in the Natural Rate and the Slope of the Phillips Curve
Next, I con…ne my focus exclusively on the post-reform period, 1993 -2015, because it gives an impression of a sudden death of the Phillips curve, following the virtual completion of all economic reforms (see Figure 1) . I consider supply shocks, a possible post-GFC increase in the natural rate and, following the rationale of Lucas (1973) , a possible change in the slope of the Phillips curve due to an increased frequency of the monetary policy shocks since the introduction of the O¢ cial Cash Rate (OCR) in 1999.
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The factors a¤ecting in ‡ation from the demand side are already incorporated in the speci…cation of the Phillips curve, because they represent a movement along the Phillips curve. However, the supply shock shifts the position of the Phillips curve but they do that exactly the same way as the changes in in ‡ation expectations do. Thus, they are observationally equivalent. One question arises naturally: how well does the survey data on the in ‡ation expectations captures all relevant supply shocks and, in particular, the oil price shock? Table 3 1993Q1 -2015Q4
(1)
In determining the ANZ's in ‡ation expectations variable, the estimated co-e¢ cient for the oil price (and not its percentage change since the previous year) turns out to be positive and highly signi…cant.
Clearly, regression results presented in Table 3 reveal that the oil price and the ANZ expectation are linearly dependant and hence should not be included together in the same regression. However, the Phillips curve hypothesis dictates that the regression equation must include a measure of the in ‡ation expectations such as the ANZ data. Therefore, we drop the oil price but not the oil price in ‡ation from the regressions.
In other words, the data on in ‡ation expectations assimilates information on the absolute value of the oil price quite well but the information surprise conveyed by the "oil price in ‡ation" has no signi…cant explanatory power and hence can be considered exogenous to the survey data.
However, it turns out that once the model is correctly speci…ed, the oil price in ‡ation turns out to be insigni…cant and does not alter any other conclusions. Therefore, I drop them from the best speci…cation of the model and report results without oil price in ‡ations.
Besides, our empirical tests show that there are two speci…c supply price shocks to the in ‡ation rate which the ANZ data on in ‡ation expectation apparently missed.
First is the sharp and swift increase in the oil price in ‡ation to about two hundred per cent between mid 2007 and mid 2008, ironically at the outset of GFC. This particular shock, according to , was worldwide and contributed to the missing disin ‡ation puzzle.
Second, is the positive in ‡ation shock in 2011, representing the lagged cost-push e¤ect from the GST, introduced in 2010. Table 4 below presents results from the OLS regressions of the new classical Phillips curve, (1), with and without the assumption of rational expectations, but with suitable dummy variables to include the two idiosyncratic supply shocks and possible changes in the natural rate following the GFC shock in 2007. In particular, the modi…ed equation for organising the data for the OLS estimations is as follows: (12) where, either (i) z t;q = t;q and x t;q = E t 1;q [ t;q ]; or, (ii) = 1 and z t;q = ( t;q E t 1;q [ t;q ]). Besides, D 1 and D 2 represent two slope dummies corresponding to the periods 1993 -1999 and 2000 -2015, respectively; D 3 = 1, if t 2007, otherwise zero; and it denotes the post-GFC dummy for the natural rate of unemployment, which I set to equal four per cent, following Razzak (2010) . The dummies D 4 and D 5 denote, respectively, the oil price in ‡ation shock of 2008, which pushed in ‡ation against the inertia of the GFC to constitute a genuine surprise, and the cost-push shock in 2011 from the GST increase in 2010.
The null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of both year dummies are zero is rejected for column (2) with an F-statistic of 9.22 to imply almost zero probability of error. Similar results hold also for columns (3) and (4). The inclusion of the natural rate dummy signi…cantly alters the conclusion regarding the change of the slope but its estimated coe¢ cient implies the post-GFC natural rate to be …fteen per cent, which is theoretically unreasonable.
30 Table 4 These regressions use quarterly data for the year to year CPI inflation rate and builds on the model explored in Table 3 Under all four plausible speci…cations the slope of the unemployment gap (i) consistently reveals the theoretically correct sign, (ii) often with signi…cance at a very high level and (iii) shows an increase after 1999 in all speci…cations but (3) which includes a dummy for the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) for the post GFC period beginning in 2008. However, (3) implies an unreasonably large increase in the NRU to …fteen percent during the GFC.
Nontradable In ‡ation and One Surprising Finding
Next, I repeat the exercise but this time measuring the in ‡ation rate with only the nontradable component of the CPI. Imported in ‡ation is arguably exogenous to monetary policy in a small economy. The in ‡ation expectations too re ‡ect arguably by the monetary policy stance which has a relatively direct and immediate impact on the prices of the non-tradable goods. After all, they do not face global competition and hence absorb the monetary policy impact signi…cantly more than the rest of the economy. So, I present below in Table 5 a set of results comparable to the same reported in Table  4 with the overall CPI in ‡ation. All speci…cations but (1) reject with high degree of signi…cance the claim that the slope did not increase in the post-1999 era. Also, with non-tradable CPI data, (3) implies that the NRU estimate during the GFC increased only reasonably by half a percentage point.
As above, the test with the null hypothesis that all of the coe¢ cients of the two year dummies are equal to zero in column (2) yields an F-statistic equal to 6.54. I reject that null hypothesis with 0.002 probability of error. Similar results hold for columns (3) and (4).
The natural rate dummy (when included) turns out to be insigni…cant but its inclusion changes no other conclusions, surprisingly unlike the case with the CPI in ‡ation reported in column (3) of Table 4 . Interestingly, also, the estimate of the natural rate dummy in column (3) of Table 5 implies a post-GFC increase to 4.6 per cent, which is a theoretically plausible estimate, unlike the case presented in Table 4 when the in ‡ation rate calculation does not exclude the tradable component of the CPI.
Most importantly, from the results of the Chow tests reported above in Tables 4 and  5 , the increase in slope turns out to be robust especially if we consider the nontradable component of the in ‡ation rate but the result loses clarity if we consider the CPI in ‡ation rate which, by construction, is contaminated by the imported in ‡ation.
Therefore, I conclude that by separating the component of the CPI over which the monetary policy of a small open economy can exert little in ‡uence we may discover insightful results. In particular, by measuring in ‡ation with the non-tradable component of the CPI, we may not only …nd a reasonable estimate of the NRU in the post-GFC period but also a stronger support for the conclusion of this paper regarding the steepening of the Phillips curve.
Regressions using the annualized in ‡ation rate (i.e., quarterly in ‡ation x 4) generally yield lower signi…cance but keep the two main conclusions intact:
(1) the Phillips Curve hypothesis holds and the new classical model exhibits this more signi…cantly.
(2) the slope always shows an increase after 1999. This is a robust result. The only caveat is that the signi…cance may vary depending on the model and the data used.
To sum up, regressions never yield a result where either the Chow test suggests no change in the slope in the post 1999 era coupled with a pair of estimates for the slopes that suggests the slope becomes ‡atter after 1999. This is a surprising …nding contrary to conventional wisdom popularised in McDermott (2015) which suggests otherwise.
Concluding Remarks
I have examined New Zealand data on in ‡ation and unemployment between 1987 and 2015 to conclude that it can be spanned by shifting an appropriately estimated Phillips curve with the survey data on in ‡ation expectations. I have used the theories of rational expectations and time consistency to build the theory of credibility that is relevant for interpreting the narrative history of the disin ‡ation experience in New Zealand. That theoretical interpretation of history has served as a guide in two important ways. It guided my design of the empirical exercises and, in particular, my idiosyncratic partitioning of the data for developing key hypotheses related to my research questions. Also, it guided my interpretations of the test results, including my evaluations of the theoretical plausibility of the econometric estimates of key parameters.
It turns out that people's perception of the policy making environment and the rational expectation of in ‡ation that is consistent with the long-run equilibrium outcome of in ‡ation in that environment plays the key role for our understanding of the changing positions and slopes of the Phillips curve. Overall, the Phillips curve hypothesis remains a valid view of the interaction between the real and nominal sides of an economy. The expected in ‡ation can act as a shifter of the Phillips curve and a¤ect both in ‡ation and unemployment without undermining the relationship of the two, as predicted by the Phillips curve hypothesis. In other words, this hypothesis is not to be rejected simply due to the lack of a contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and in ‡ation during occasional periods in the New Zealand history of disin ‡ation.
The above …nding has implications for monetary policy, wage and price-setting behaviour and real activity. It also o¤ers a uni…ed theoretical explanation for three apparently distinct episodes of history concerning disin ‡ation in New Zealand: (i) the disin ‡ation and accompanying deep recession of the early 1990s; (ii) the decline of unemployment with little change in in ‡ation, leading to a low in ‡ation and low unemployment outcome in the late 1990s; and, (iii) volatile in ‡ation with little change in unemployment between 2000 and 2007, coupled with the puzzle of missing disin ‡a-tion despite an increase in unemployment, following the global …nancial crisis (GFC), between 2008 and 2015.
In particular, I conclude that the early 1990s deep recession seems to have been caused by an unmet expectation due to the lack of credibility of the RBNZ's ability to sustain the drastically reduced in ‡ation without complementary …scal and labour market reforms. However, once the labour market and …scal reforms were completed, increased credibility of a low in ‡ation target brought down the in ‡ation expectation swiftly to its new equilibrium level and temporarily anchored it at that level.
Subsequently, since 1999, changes in the political climate led to revisions of the hallmarks of the earlier economic reforms. Also the explicit changes in the PTAs detracted the Governor's focus away from in ‡ation targeting and his subsequent activities made news headlines that created confusion and controversies. Those developments might have compromised the credibility of in ‡ation targeting and unanchored the in ‡ation expectations. Arguably, afterwards, in ‡ation expectations became more susceptible to external shocks and hence more volatile in the post-1999 era. In the expectation augmented Phillips curve paradigm, those behavioural changes in the in ‡ation expectations, in turn, would cause relatively large ‡uctuations in the in ‡ation rate without any signi…cant changes in the unemployment rate as observed in this period.
I also note that, after an initial period of ‡attening in the late nineties, the Phillips curve has become steeper in the post-1999 era, apparently due to an increased frequency of the monetary policy shocks in the public's perception. From that discovery, I derive one policy conclusion: the implication of the public perception of the policy making environment plays a critical role in identifying the rational expectation of in ‡ation which helps identify the exact location of the Phillips curve for the policymakers.
However, the …nding of a steeper Phillips curve in the post 1999 era comes as a surprise and it carries with it an important policy implication. For example, an activist monetary policy, as manifested by the recent cut in the O¢ cial Cash Rate (OCR) at a time of a historically high house price in ‡ation, may cause a relatively large increase in in ‡ation without causing any signi…cant change in unemployment. 31 If, in addition, it 31 However, the monetary laxity signalled by the rate cut may bypass the goods-price in ‡ation to show up as an asset-price in ‡ation as postulated by Bordo and Landon-Lane (2015) . adds fuel to the rise in the average expectation regarding non-tradable in ‡ation, then a time-inconsistent and hence less credible policy of a low in ‡ation regime may ironically bring about stag ‡ation due to unmet in ‡ation expectations. I leave the veri…cation of that conjecture for future research.
I end this paper by noting a very crucial policy lesson from the theories of in ‡a-tion dynamics. A good understanding of the direct e¤ect of the expected in ‡ation on the current realizations of unemployment and in ‡ation helps construct better economic policies as well as better monetary policies. The overall political stance of the government and not just a law, which politics can overturn, determines the rational expectations of in ‡ation in the economy. Therefore, the outcome of a specifc monetary policy objective, in general, depends on the consistency of the overal objective of the government and not just on the transparency and independence of the Governor's operative procedures.
Bibliography 7 Appendix
The following tables report regression results based on the annualized quarterly in‡ation data to avoid the moving average errors. However, the data on in ‡ation expectations are annual and not annualized. Therefore, the interpretation of regression results presented below is subject to a limitation that they are not mutually consistent, contrary to the requirements of the underlying theoretical models. Table 1A supports conclusions derived from Table 1 included in the paper, other than the fact that column 3 becomes less signi…cant but column 6 and 8 give the right sign. Column 1 based on the full sample of data provides a robust evidence for the new classical Phillips curve similar to Lucas (1972) . Column 2 gives the wrong sign for the unemployment gap, plausibly due to signi…cant changes in the in ‡ation expectations. Note that the F-stat for the whole regression drops, the Chow test robustly rejects the hypothesis that the slopes remain unchanged, and estimates show an increase in magnitude. Column 1 now has stronger Chow test results to reject the hypothesis of the slopes being the same. The slopes still generally increase in all regressions.
